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'OUR BROTHERS,
OUR SISTERS,
OUR SONS' *

A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF
RESISTANCE INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA

Prepared for the
PCR Commission Meeting
by
Robert Hislaire and
Prexy Nesbitt
July 1981

* Tit~e taken from · a clandestine leaflet circulated
inside South Africa in the early 1970s.
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PREFACE
The five years since June 1976 have seen a risi ~ g
level of popular struggle combined with an expanding
campaign of armed action.
-__, __

The most visible and frequent form of resistance
during the recent period has been action over specific
grievances which are a direct effect of the apartheid
system on people's lives •••
There have been widespread
and sustained struggles on several fronts, often at an
unprecedented level; struggles against the denial of
trade union rights and low pay for black workers;
against high and increasing rents and other housing
costs; against crippling increases in the transport
fares which black people have to pay to travel to the
shops, factories and offices in "white areas" from the
ghetto "townships" and "locations" in which they are
forced to live; against inferior, racially segregated
education; against forced removals and relocation of
whole communities in both urban and rural areas.
Few conclusions perhaps can be drawn about relations
between underground political activity and the open
political activity.
All evidence indicates that the
situation goes far beyond opposition only to specific
or isolated effects of apartheid. · There is a clear
demand for liberation and total eradication of the
system, with widespread support for the armed struggle.
(Developments in South Africa
Since the Uprising of 1976,
General Assembly, A/Conf. 107/3,
20 April 1981, p.4}

What seems to be happening in South Africa today is
a process.

It is one wherein slowly but steadily significant

sectors of the South African people are becoming "the mountains"
of the resistance inside the country.

Today, three basic

sources can be identified as jointly co~stituting the threat
to the apartheid system:

namely, 1) internal resistance by

the oppressed; 2) the shifting balance of forces in South

Africa; and 3) the growing strength of the international movement to isolate South Africa.

Of the three clearly the most

· critical is the internal resistance struggle.

This has been
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long recognized.

2 -

What is new is the accelerating rate at

which the population is becoming more and more engaged.

The

late Amilcar Cabral perhaps best described it when he was
chidingly told by a journalist at a ' London press conference
in 1971 that the PAIGC could never win for Guinei Bissau did
not have the proper terrain for guerilla struggle.

Cabral

answered patiently with the clear, calm style he had, "our
. people are our mountains."
Three movements have thus far been at the vortex
of black resistance to the apartheid regime of South Africa:
The African National Congress

(ANC) and its associate organiza-

tion, the South African Congress of Trade Unions

(SACTU), the

oldest liberation movement formed in 1912; the Pan African
Congress of Azania (PAC), formed by Africanists having split
from the ANC in 1959 over ideological questions; and finally
various groups such as the South African Students' Organization
(SASO) which had been led by Steve Biko and later banned, and
today, AZAPO,

the Azanian People's Organization, ASASCO, the

Azanian Students' Organization and COSAS, the Congress of
South African Students, all generally grouped under the generic
banner of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM).
The purposes of this paper ar~ the following:
(1) to examine each of the three major movements cited
above in the light of concrete action taken against
the racist regime of South Africa;
(2) to attempt to delineate the amount of support each
organization enjoys amongst the oppressed in South
Africa;
(3) to identify who endorses these organizations, whether
1
interna1 ) or external participants and supporters;
(4) and finally to ascertain the amount of media coverage
each organization has been given in recent years.

1) e.g., Bishop ~utu, General Secretary of the South African
Council of Churches, in spite of the constraint of fue illegality
of associating with, even quoting "banned organizations", has
consistently worked with such ANC-related projects as the
"Freedom Charter" and "Free Mandela" campaigns.
..I3
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What is not attempted in the following pages is a
systematic effort to examine the mechanism of opp ~ essio ~ and
repression in South Africa.
not permit such a discussion.

Unfortunately, space and time do
; '

Thus, the reader should bear

in mind that serious description and commentary on the
dialectic between repression and resistance -

a critical

component to fully perceiving the nature of resistance in
· South Africa -

is absent herein.

Before any discussion of the three organizations'
activities is undertaken, it might be beneficial to present
a brief history of each of these movements.
African National Congress
The African National Congress came into being on
January 8 1912, emerging from a coalition of intellectuals,
2
peasants and workers. )
Amongst its first demands were: one
man one vote,
all of Africa.

land for the peasantry and freedom and unity for
A year later, with the passing of the Land Act,

the ANC sent a delegation to London asking for its suppression
(the British government had the right to veto), a demand that
was not met favorably.

The 1920s and 1930s saw the increasing

in numbers of the black working class due to growth in the
South African economy, especially in the mining sector.
Consequently, there were more and more attempts to establish
black trade unions.

This period saw as well the first major

strikes led by a growing black labour movement.

The struggle

against the decision to withdraw suffrage rights from Cape
Coloureds and Africans was . led by the ANC in the same period,
and resulted in a compromise in which Africans were offered
consultative representation.

In the 1940s and 1950s,· the ANC

increasingly showed its willingness to unite with all groups
dedicated to the struggle against white supremacy.
"The ANC's resistance to racially-based nationalism was
stillfurther reinforced once it began to seek organizational alliances across tne colour line in the 1950s,
2) "Colonialisme, Apartheid et luttes de liberation".
Afrique
du Sud-Namibie.
Dernier trimestre 1977. pp. 26-27; Benson,
Mary, The African Patriots, Faber and Faber, London, 1963 •
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- 4 first with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC)
and later with coloureds and anti-government whites.
These alliances, made initially with the object of
boosting the ANC's organizational capacity, eventually
also had a profound effect on the shaping of African
ideology, for once the ANC , had embraced the strategy
of a multi-racial unitedfront, the adoption of a~J
more racially exclusive creed became impossible."
These new alliances were exemplified by the agreement
between the ANC and the SAIC in July 1951 to form a Joint
Planning Council for national campaign of civil disobedience,
and in 1953-54, the establishment by the ANC of working relationships with the South African Coloured People's Organization
and the South African Congress of Democra~s, the latter a
white, mostly English-speaking organization.
On June 26 1956, a year after the Congress of the
People had been held, the Freedom Charter was adopted by the

ANC.

The Charter outlined the major political orientations

the ANC's struggle was to take against the white South African
regime, and it also stressed the ANC's commitment to a nonracial ideology in which the fruits of South Africa were to
he shared and enjoyed by all.

Shortly after adoption of the

Charter, 156 members of .the ANC were arrested under the
accusation of high treason.

The banning of the ANC (along

with the PAC) was to follow, after the Sharpeville massacre
of March 21 1960, under the Unlawful Organizatio~s Act of
April 8 1960~

Following the bannings, the importance of

armed struggle as a mode of political resistance began to
emerge, as the previous policy of non-violence had failed to
achieve any positive result for the oppressed, and in fact,
the liberation movements' voices had been legally stifled.
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania emerged as an
independent organization in 1959, after a long debate within
the ANC concerning the means and ideology that should be
utilized in order to achieve the 1iberation of the racially

3) Gail M. Gerhart.
of an Ideology".

"Black Power in South Africa.
The Evolution
University of California Press, 1978, p.101 .
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oppressed.

The Africanist fraction of the ANC,

(before the

split) which became increasingly strong in the ANC Youth ~ League,
rejected the idea that all anti-racist forces should be regrouped
under one non-racial organization. ,· The Africanists argued that
it was necessary to bring together all Africans, since it was
they, by birthright who possessed the land of South Africa,
further they argued that the former colonialisers and other
· ethnic minorities such as the Coloureds and Indians should be
permitted to remain only on acceptance of the majority's terms.
As the 1959 Africanist Inaugural Convention declared in its
founding documents:
"We aim politically, at government of the Africans by
the Africans for the Africans, with everybody who owes
his only loyalty to Africa, who is prepared to accept
the democratic rule of an African majority, being
regarded as an African.
We guarantee no minority
rights, because ye think in terms of individuals and
not of groups." 4
.
.
·
Thus, it was necessary according to the ·PAC, to unify
all Black Africans and only Black Africans under one political
force and only then, from a position of strength, could discussion
under the PAC's terms take place.

White opponents to the South

African regime were to be viewed with deep mistrust, as they,
despite their fundamental disagreement with white supremacist
policies, still continued to reap the benefits that white South
Africa offered them.

Consequently, the ANC's non-racial ideology

was to be vehemently rejected.

The formative viewpoint of PAC

on white liberals was clearly stated in the same 1959 documents
alluded to above.

Speaking of the whites in the ANC they stat~d:

"These 'leaders' consider South Africa and its wealth
to belong to all who live in it, the alien dispossessors
and the indigenous victims.
They regard as equals the
foreign master and his indigenous slave, the white
exploiter and the African exploited, the foreign
oppressor and the indigenous oppressed.
They regard
as brothers the subject Africans and their European
overlords.
They are too incredibly naive and too
fantastically unrealistic .to see that the interests of
the subject peoples who are criminally oppressed, ruthlessly exploited and unhumanly degraded, are in sharp
4) "PAC in Perspective", pub-lished by the Mission to Europe and
the Americas, PAC of Azania, London, England, 1973, pp.12-13 •
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conflict and in pointed contradiction with those of
the white ruling class."
"The PAC recognizes the existence in South Africa of
minority national groups d 'f European and Indian origin.
Contrary to all other parties, we recognize the socalled Coloureds as Africans.
The tragedy of the South
African political situation is that many allegedly progressive white intellectuals fail to outgrow the racist
environment into which they are born and bred.
As a
result, they seek to infiltrate the liberation movement
in order to shape its policy and programme in the image
of their own intellectual wavering.
They seek to import
into the movement the racist antagonism of the white
man against the Africans.
This antagonism becomes
particularly acute when the Africans refuse to serve
the private political interests of the 'progressive'
white man." 5)
In March· 1960, eleven months after its formation,

the

PAC, under its Positive Action Campaign, called for mass civil
disobedience throughout South Africa.

Government reaction

followed quickly in the shape of the Sharpeville and Langa
massacres on March 21 1960, and the subsequent banning of both
South African liberation movements.
Throughout this period, the PAC continued to enjoy
large support amongst the black masses as it had answered to
the desire for action expressed by many Africans.

Further,

PAC had demonstrated that the apartheid regime wquld in fact
use all means possible to crush any fdrm of black opposition,
be it violent or non-violent.

An increasing number of Africans

identified with the PAC, as it stressed bold political action
and the need for blacks to create a new identity for themselves
without the interference of outside forces.
The Black Consciousness Movement
The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), relatively
new when compared to the ANC and the PAC,
"grew up through an increased realisation amongst black
intellectuals of their own systematic exploitation and
in reaction to white paternalism, but it was fuelled
by resistance to the government-sponsored ideology of
ethnicity that was used to justify the Bantustan programme."6)

5) Ibid. p.15 and 16.
6) "South Africa in the 1980s", published by CIIR, p.25.
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- 1 Despite the international prominence given to the
BCM during 1976 and the uprisings now called Soweto, the
actual beginnings of the BCM can be traced to dates as early
as July 1968 when at the then mixed ' Congress of the National
Union of South African Students

(NUSAS) Steve Biko and fellow

black medical students drew aside to discuss their second
class citizenship within the NUSAS.

Another source of the

, BCM is the struggle around the national question and the founding of the PAC.

A third source of the BCM from 1966 onwards

was the "Black Theology" movement in the USA.
From the beginning BCM was not one organization or
one political movement.

All indications are that the BCM

never functioned as a formal federation or coalition.

The

"statement of principles" for the BCM was not written.

It was

a generalized mood of assertion, pride and anger that was its
constitution.

The BCM was a torrent of various organizations

with two main constltuent groups constituting the BCM, namely,
the South African Students Organization (SASO) and the Black

People's Convention (BPC) with its related Black Communities
Programme (BCP).
~

Something of fue breadth and depth of the

can be gleaned from the following partial listing of

organizations and groups.

A PARTIAL LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE BCM
South African Students Organization (SASO)
National Youth Organization (NYO)
South African Students Movement (SASM)
Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC)
African Teachers Association of SA (ATASA)
South African Black Scholars Association (SABSA)
Association for Educational and Cultural Advanc~ment of
Africans (ASSECA)
Transvaal Labour Youth Organization
Black People's Convention (BPC)
Black Parents Federation (BPF)
Black Parents Association (BPA)
Soweto Parents Association (SPA)
Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU)
Union of Black Journalists (UBJ)
People's Experimental Theatre · (PET)
Housewives League
Soweto African Traders Association

•• I 8

-

8 -

Shebeen Owners Association
Witwatersrand Taxi Association
The Inter-Denominational African Ministers Association
of SA (IDAMASA)
The African Independent Churc6's Association (AICA)
The Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)
Unlike the ANC, whites were not permitted to join
the different groups making up the BCM, but also differentiating
, themselves from the PAC policy of POQO (we alone), the BCM
brought together as

'Black', all minorities such as Coloureds

and Indians who also suffered from racial oppression.
Throughout, BCM spokespersons differentiated themselves from both ANC and PAC.

As one spokesman said recently:

"As to whether we will operate like the ANC or the
PAC, the only difference in terms of ou~nvolvement
~ t h a t the ANC and the PAC have opted for armed
s~uggle as t~solution ~ t h e problems of our
country.
We have always seen ourselves as an
internal resistance movement, not only changing
people psychologically, but also making them aware
that they can do something physically." 7)
Nonetheless, it can be said that the BCM has drawn
its strength from two major factors.

Firstly, the banning

of the two major liberation movements in 1960 meant that
there was no longer any ~gal organization that could represent
Black demands within South Africa.

There was a great need for

an organization to fill in this vacuum.

Secondly, and perhaps

most importantly, the Soweto uprisings of 1976 and the
government's reaction provided a large mass of youth and
students open to BCM ideas, and thirsty for political action
concerning existing realities and conditions within the townships.

Various BCM organizations of black youth were logical

and available vehicles for these new waves of angry black
youth.
"Now after June 16 (1976 Soweto) the degree of political
awareness has developed to such an extent that even
eight-year olds understand what you mean by politics .•.
7) "What is the Black Consciousness Movement of South Africa?",
South African News Agency (SANA) BULLETIN, No.11, August
1979, p.3.

..I9
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Adults who were afraid to participate in politics in
Soweto because of the number of people who have been
killed have now realized that it does not really
matter whether you fight or not, the regime still
kills you.
They accept that it is better to die
fighting than just to be killed m your own house." 8)

ANC
During the period that led up to the formation of the
r

PAC, the ANC can be said to have lost the initiative in the
struggle for liberation.

The ANC was in disarray following

the arrest of many of its leaders, was unable to respond
adequately to the changes that were taking place within white
supremacist power structures, and was unable to answer
effectively to the orthodox nationalism that was becoming
prevalent amongst the majority of the African population.
The ANC had not yet been able to analyse these changes and
to propose a convincing alternative to the strong arguments
for

'going it alone'.

This is exemplified by the fact that

it was the PAC that was largely responsible for most concrete
action that was to take place during the period of its short
legal existence.

The PAC was merely, it claimed, putting into

effect the 1949 ANC Youth League Programme of Action which
called for new methods of struggle such as strikes, civil
disobedience, boycotts, non-cooperation and open defiance of
unjust laws.
The confusion that the ANC found itself in is demonstrated by Nelson Mandela's words, spoken during the Rivonia
trial in 1962, where he was accused, along with other ANC
members, of sabotage and conspiracy to overthrow the government by revolution:
"We of the ANC have always stood for a non-racial
democracy, and we shrank from any action which might
drive the races further apart than they already are.
But the hard facts were that the 50 years of nonviolence had brought nothing but more and more repressive legislation and fewer and fewer rights ...
It is a fact that for a long time the people had been
talking of violence - of the day when they would fight

8) Speech given by Mr Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu BCM of South Africa
to the Assembly of the IUEF held irt Geneva, November 22 1976,
page 4.
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the white man and win back their country - and we,
the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always prevailed upon them to--;;oid violence and to pursue
peaceful methods.
When some of us discussed this
in May and June 1961, it ~~uld not be denied that our
policy to achieve a non-racial state by non-violence
had achieved nothing, and that our followers were
beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were
developing disturbing ideas of terrorism." 9)
The purpose of this section on the ANC is to attempt
to determine, through the examination of press clippings,
whether the ANC after its relative loss of influence in the
late 1950s and 1960s, has been able to emerge as an effective
liberation movement, whether it has gained large internal
and external support and finaliy, whether its political and
military action has been effective in view of its objectives.
In an interview given to 'Southern Africa' magazine,

the ANC

Secretary-General Alfred Ny o stated that the aims of the ANC
today were as follows:
"The aim, eventually, is to draw an armed people into
the struggle.
An armed people, developing around the
core that has been set up - the people's army, Umkonto
We Siwze - that is our aim.
But in order to get our
people to reach that situation you must get a people
that is politically conscious now, to accept the
inevitability of this form of struggle and that is
what is happening in South Africa today.
It is impossible to avoid the political mobilisation of the
people, which in our view must form the firm and
reliable base for the escalation of the military." 10)
Has the ANC been able to work effectively towards
th~ se aims?

The authors of the recent Catholic Institute for

International Relations' booklet,

'South Africa in the 1980s',

argue that the ANC has successfully begun to carry out this
plan and, since the June 1976 Soweto uprisings, more and more
Africans have bee~ open to the ideas, methods and objectives
of the ANC.

9) "Nelson Mandela Speaks" South African Studies 4, pp. 89-90,
published by Publicity and Information Bureau ANC-SA, London.
lO)"A Voice for Liberation - ANC Leader Interviewed", Southern
Africa, January/February 1981.
../11
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The ANC gained important new recruits in the
wake of the 1976 police riots.
No other movement
is as geared to benefit from the labour militancy
and student protest that now dominate black politics.
Similarly, in its central ' 'policy statement, the Freedom
Charter, the ANC put forward a programme for the whole
nation appealing to a wide spectrum of opinion in
its emphasis on democracy and egalitarianism." 11)
Not only do the authors claim that the ANC has been

gaining support due to the increasing militancy that emerged
among Black youth in 1976, but they argue further that the
ANC's socialist analysis of society -has also brought increased
support amongst Black workers in important industrial areas.
They argue that attempts to organize outside the usual trade
union channels is providing more and more potential recruits
for the ANC, and that activity carried out with success by
the ANC has been a source of great joy in the industrial
townships.
The CIIR authors conclude that
"(the ANC) finds itself today a strictly disciplined
underground movement with a wide penumbra of
sympathisers making preparations for guerilla war,
a position assumed by them in the face of the intransigence of the South African government, after
pursuing a policy of non-violent change for half a
century." 12)
Do press clippings justify the CIIR's conclusions or
do they in fact demonstrate that this analysis has been too
hasty?

Press cuttings 13) seem to show a resurgence of ANC

activity, both militarily and politically.

Newspapers world-

wide have been giving increasing coverage to ANC activities
carried out within South Africa, and of its diplomatic efforts
abroad.

Also, and perhaps most significantly, an examination

of the world press seems to provide grounds for thinking that
the apartheid government sees the African National Congress
as the organization that is posing the most serious threa~ to
11) Catholic Institute for International Relations, "South
Africa in the 1980s", London, 1981, pp.33-34.
12) Ibid. pp. 35-36.
13) Press cuttings that have been used for the purpose of this
report on the ANC, PAC and BCM, come from a period of
approximately Gears, Le.~rom 1977 up to the present day •
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The South African Defence Forces

have been stepping up attacks over recent years against alleged
ANC members in neighbouring countr ~~s, or refugee camps in
these same countries arid on military bases in Angola.

A few

examples of SADF activity in this sphere are the attack on ANC
14
members in Swaziland in February 1978
), the kidnapping of ANC
'

official, Ndugu Victor Matlou whilst on his way to Maseru,
15)
Lesotho
, and the attack by South African commandos on ANC
refugee camps in Matola, Mozambique in which twelve people
16
were killed.
)
On top of its military offensive against ANC centres
and members,

the South African government has stepped up its

vocal attacks on the ANC and has at times in trials attempted
to make an example of ANC militants in the hope that sympathisers
might be discouraged from further activity within the organization.

The trial of three Blacks·in November 1980 accused of

taking part in a raid on a South African police station, and
sentenced to be hung, was reported in the Guardian in the
following manner:
"Observers here believe yesterday's death sentences
reflect a general stiffening by the authorities of
penalties for the growing insurgency in South Africa,
much of which appears to have official or unofficial
ANC sponsorship." 17)
The head of the South African security police has also
stated on various occasions that the ANC is increasingly viewed
as the "largest terrorist organization" operating within South
18
Africa
) and that most guerilla activity taking place within
the country was to be blamed on the ANC:
"Brigadier Coetzee commented in the South African Star
(newspaper) ~hat attempts by the banned Pan Africanist
Congress at organized terrorism had little or no success.
The ANC was another matter; it had far more sophisticated
organizational structure and it was from its ranks that
most of the terrorists active in South Africa in recent
times had come.'" 19)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)

Maputo radio report February 1978.
Daily News (Tanzania) December 21, 1979.
The Guardian (UK) February 7, 1981 .
The Guardian (UK) November 27, 1980.
Financial Mail December 19, 1980.
Southern Africa January 1979 .
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- 13 The South African paper, the Rand Daily Mail reported
that on April 21, 1981, Security Police headquartered at ~ Pretoria
stated that

--

;'

"insurgents - believed to be infiltrators - had become
more advanced and organized.
The police further
asserted that at the disposal of the insurgents were:
A) a sophisticated system of underground shelters;
B) elaborate hidden caches where weapons were stored
and made ready for use only on the day of attack;
C) a dead letterbox system of communications in which
underground hidden postboxes were used for mes~ages,
instructions, and money transfers.
Additionally, the police claimed that since 1979 all
incursions into South .Africa had been from Mozambique
via Swaziland. 19i)
Quentin Peel, until recently the British Financial

Times correspondent in South Africa, has also corroborated the
CIIR stipulation of ANC paramountcy stating in June this year:
"Although the black community remains deeply divided,
largely leaderless, and alienated, there is no doubt
the multi-racial stance of the ANC is attracting increasing support •.. Most recentbannings and detentions
have been of activists showing signs of moving from the
Black Consciousness camp to the ANC." 19ii)
There is evidence as well to show that continuous
attempts have been made by the apartheid government to discredit
the ANC abroad, by continuously emphasizing the ANC relationship

with the South African Communist Party.

Louis L~ Grange,

presently Minister of Police, claimed ~n October 10, 1979,
that the ANC was merely a cover for the SACP in its fight for
20
a Marxist---::-:volution in South Africa.
) ~ 1 indications are
that there will be an increased effort by South African Government forces

to attack the ANC by publicizing its alleged

"communist"/Moscow domination.

External and objective

analysts, however, dispute these arguments and in fact cl~im
that the SACP has been losing some of its influence in the ANC,
due to the new flow of recruits the ANC has been attracting.
The CIIR commentary previously cited states:
19i) Rand Daily Mail (South Africa) ' April 21, 1981.
19ii}Financial Times (UK) June 15, 1981.
20)
Focus on Political Repression in South Africa - News
Bulletin of International Defense and Aid Fund.

../14

- 14 "There is, indeed, no evidence to suggest that the SACP
has any substantial presence in South Africa, whil_e_ _
ANC cells and sympathisers, local sources suggest,
have recently been growing appreciably.
The structure
of the ANC, emerging i n t ~ ~ 1980s, would be that of a
popularMtionalist movement with a movement and
leadership quite unlike the communist front organization of whites' fears." . 21)
In fact,

the data itself seems to indicate that,

rather than being a SACP front,

the ANC itself is behind many

organizations inside South Africa.

The CIIR analysis points

this out asserting:
"It is safe to say that in all political or social
groupings and associations, ANC members and sympathizers
will be found pressing for a----;;rker orientation and
pushing debate into the context of national liberation.
While a small minority (of the ANC) will be committed
communists many more will seek ~ationalism involving
varying degrees of socialist transformation of society
coupled with a strong element of state control." (page 36)
This particular CIIR perspective has been further
reinforced by recent repoits concerning a relative loss of
influence of communist cadres within the ANC.

Some commentators

feel fuat this loss of influence is well demonstrated by the fact
that Joe Slovo, a member of the SACP, and also for a long period
head of the ANC military wing, is likely to see his military
leadership role· taken away, and given to a younger Black
22
activist, Thabo Mbeki.
)
"Many fresh ANC guerillas joined the movement not
because theyeppreciated its views on dialectical
_materialism, but because the ANC is widely considered
in South Africa to be the onlyexile group currently
capable of waging a guerilla war against Pretoria." 23)
The second reason for the apartheid regime to continuously
stress the ANC/SACP relationship, is the hope that it would
discourage potential external support.

Evidence shows, however,

that contrary to the South African objective of isolating the
ANC, the ANC has benefitted from increasing support in most
African countries and has also made . headway in countries that
· are relatively fearful of the spectre of communism.
21) "South Africa in the 1980s", pp. 34-35.
22) Africa Confidential, January 28, 1981.
23) Ibid.
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- 15 As of this moment,

the ANC has offices in Nigeria,

Algeria, Senegal, Egypt, Zambia, Tanzania and Angola.

It has

"representatives" in Botswana, Moz ~mbique, Lesotho, Swaziland
and Zimbabwe.

In 1979, the South African Minister of Justice

claimed that the ANC received 4 million pounds in aid the year
before from Eastern European and Scandinavian countries.

He

also claimed that the ANC was training guerillas during that
same period in Botswana and Mozambique.

24 )

Though both these

claims are difficult to verify, since the frontline states have
continuously stressed that they could not permit AN_C military
bases within their borders due to their vulnerability to South
African military offensives, it is most probable that the ANC
has indeed received large sums of money and has been getting,
if not direct military aid, broad material support, offices
and opportunities to express ANC views in those countries.
Algeria, already actively supporting the Western
Saharan liberation movement, allowed ANC to hold a conference
in Algiers in 1979

25 ), in which the heads of the mission bureaux

all over the world were brought together and analysed their
work.

In the beginning of 1980, ministers from Angola,

Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome met and
vowed to give greater support to the ANC.

26)

What is clear is that ANC support is not limited to
the frontline states but throughout Africa.

Following the

kidnapping of ANC member, Victor Matlou whilst on his way to
Lesotho in December 1979, that same country protested energetically
and eventually managed to secure his release.

27 )

In the first·

half of 1980, the ANC's Freedom School opened in Tanzania in
which children were to learn technical skills and in which

.
.
. 1 attitu
· d es. 28 )
e d ucation
was a 1 so to b e geare d to correcting
racia
In June 1980 the West German Social Democrats welcomed ANC
plans to establish an office in Bonn in these terms:

24)
25)
26)
27)
28)

. The Guardian (UK) May 7, 1979. ,
L'Afrique Democratique (France) September 1979.
Daily News (Tanzania) January 29, 1980.
Daily News (Tanzania) May 17, 1980.
Anti-Apartheid News May 1980.
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- 16 "The Federal Government should give the ANC political
assistance and also help it to overcome~reaucratic
obstacles.
Only in close cooperation with it can we
find the best way for us to contribute to bringing an
end to apartheid and to c r eating rule by a democratically legitimised majority." 29)
Recently, after increasing allegations by the South
African government that the ANC was using Zimbabwe for military
• bases (denied by the ANC), Zimbabwean President Canaan Banana
announced in September 1980 full governmental support of the
30
ANc.
) Perhaps one of the most significant breakthroughs for
the ANC that year was the opening of the office in Dakhar, the
31)
capital of the pro-West and francophone Senegal.
· Finally,
most recently after the SADF raid on Matola, Mozambique, world32
wide condemnation quickly followed,
) and Mozambique emphasized
33)
its renewed support for the ANC.
"Condemnation of the attack continues.
A number of
speakers at the Non-Aligned Movement Conference in
New Delhi have criticized the attack, as has the
Organization of African Unity, the United Nations'
Secretary General, Dr Waldheim, East and West Germany
and the Association of West European Parliaments." 34)
In short, the ANC seems to have been able to consolidate
its effective foreign support in recent years.

Within South Africa, it is difficult to ·measure the
degree of support the ANC enjoys since it is illegal to
support the two banned liberation movements.

However, internal

organizations and individuals, while not giving overt recognition
of the ANC, have shown, on various occasions, that they do not
negate its value.

Consistently, inside many have come to the

aid of ANC members facing prosecution or awaiting the enactment
of death sentences.

29)
30)
31)
32)
33)
34)

Sunday Post (South Africa) June 15, 1980.
Sunday Post September 21, 1980.
Africa News October 6, 1980.
The Guardian (UK) February 12, ·.1981.
Focus
March/April 1981.
The Guardian (UK) February 12, 1981.
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Bishop Tutu, head of the South African Council of
Churches, and well-known worldwide for his non-violent activism
in the st~uggle against apartheid, stated within the context
of the Pretoria 12 trial (May 1978) : · in which ANC members were
being tried for conspiring to overthrow the government, that
he was aware that
"many people may strive to bring about change by peaceful means because it is what they are committed to;
and I understand when others feel they have exhausted
all avenues of non-violent means." 35)
Bishop Tutu has also been actively supporting the
campaign to free Nelson Mandela which is of great significance

in view of the CIIR assertion that the ANC has a significant
following inside South Africa:
"While it is true that the South African government
does try to divide and rule black political groups,
the Mandela campaign, calling for the release of a
man capable of unifying black political opinion,
demonstrates how alert the Black community remains
to such tactics." 36)
The Methodist Church has also backed the appeals of
South African Churches for a convention in which a just constitution should be drafted.

The appeal also demands that Nelson

Mandela should, among other political prisoners, take part in
3
t h e d rating
o f thi s new constitution. 7)
f .
0

•

•

After the Mat~la raid early this year, memorial
services commorating the ANC dead were planned in many areas
of South Africa, but all were banned by the government.

The

areas in which services were planned and thus affected by the
ban were:

Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Bellville, Goodwood,
38
' Wynberg, Simonstown, Kuils River and Stellanboch.
) 2

--

Gaster Buthelezi, leader of Inkatha, has tried on
various occasions to woo the ANC into talks with his organization,
39
claiming that he is not against the objectives of the ANC per se.
)
35)
36)
37)
38)
39)

Focus No. 16, May 1978.
"South Africa in the 1980s" p. 37.
The Guardian, June 11, 1980.
Rand Daily Mail, February 19, 1981.
Rand Daily Mail, October 21, 1980.
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- 18 It is difficult to verify whether talks have in fact taken
place, as Buthelezi has claimed, since the ANC has been
reluctant to comment on various of Buthelezi's claims to having
40
a relationship with the ANc.
)
N: ~ertheless, Buthelezi's
attempts to negotiate with the ANC amount to an acknowledgement
that the ANC is, in Inkatha's eyes, the main external
(external/internal?) force that must be contended with.
White South African newspapers have also discussed
the banned liberation movements, with particular reference to
an eventual change of their illegal status.

The editor of the

Afrikaan's daily "Beeld", called for the government to sit at
a conference table with the ANC, since he asserted that it
41
had the support of millions inside South Africa.
)
The
Rand Daily Mail also commented on the editor's stance and
published a long article of its own, calling for an end to the
bannings.

Two important themes emerge from this article.

Firstly, that the Beeld editorial by not mentioning the ANC's
rival, "amounts to an implicit concession that the ANC is the
main Black liberation movement in South Africa. 1142 )
Secondly,
the Rand Daily Mail claims that "the ANC is that much closer
to being regarded and treated as a viable alternative government.1143)

These articles are significant in the sense that

they give the ANC a certain legitimacy and put pressure on the
government to take up the challenge of · the liberation movements
in a different manner than increased repression, the latter
being a method which has consistently failed to discourage
or eradicate popular support.
Popular support for the ANC, judging from the amount
of trials and guerilla attacks in which ANC members or
sympathisers are reported to have taken part, seems to be
increasingly permeating South African society.

40)
41)
42)
43)

Southern Africa, September/October 1980.
Rand Daily Mail, January 10, 1981.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Since 1976, the ANC seems to have been able to step
up its military activity considerably.

The ANC's most powerful

blow came on June 1, 1980 when guerillas managed to sabotage
the SASOL plant and NATREF refiner y ' outside Johannesburg and
44)
the SASOL II plant at ,Secunda.
Guerilla attacks have
occurred in all parts of South Africa, a situation that could
not have been achieved without some backing from the local
' population.

Attacks close to the South African border have

also been increasing difficulties for white farmers there and
45)
has caused many to leave the areas under constant attack.
Since 1977 there have been continuous trials of
individuals accused of taking part in ANC guerilla attacks or
in covert activity on behalf of the ANC.

In May 1977, two

youths were sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment for
furthering the aims of the ANC and for distributing Umkhonto
We Siwze pamphlets.

During that same period ten members in

the Natal were accused of recruiting people for military
46
training.
)
After the explosion of a Sowetan bomb factory
in July 1977, in which ANC publications were found,
. d un d er t h e P revention
.
.
A ct.
were trie
o f T errorism

4 7)

six Africans
In

September of that same year, Focus reported that nine individuals

were undergoing trial for allegedly establishing escape routes
48)
for ANC recruits to flee the country.
Those accused in the
"Pretoria 12" trial during this same period were alleged to
have been part of a central underground structure in
49
Johannesburg set up by the ANc.
)
After refusing to collaborate
with the prosecution, one of the defendants exposed his perception of the struggle:
"When I joined the ANC I realized that the struggle for
freedom would be difficult and would involve sacrifices.
I was and I am willing to make those sacrifices.
I
appreciate the seriousness of my actions and accept
whatever sentence may be imposed. 50)
44)
45)
·46)
47)
48)
49)
50)

Southern Africa, November/December 1980.
The Guardian, September 23, 1980.
Focus, No. 10, May 1977.
Focus, No. 11, July 1977.
Focus, No. 12, September 1977.
Ibid.
Focus, No. 16, May 1978.
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The list of trials continues up to the present day,
affecting people from all walks of life (e.g. teachers and
51
even former policemen in 1978
)), and concerning a long list
f ,

of different activities such as simple membership, in military
training for or recruitment to the ANC.
The campaign to free Nelson Mandela also attracted
wide "grass roots" support and managed to collect a large
number of signatures in a society in which any form of sympathy
.for the ANC or for imprisoned ANC members can pose a danger
for those involved. ·
"Support for the campaign came from the coloured
community and the Natal Indian Congress, as well as
groups of white students who held 'release Mandela'
meetings _ at Cap
52 Jown, Pietermaritzburg and
Witwatersrand."
The ANC has bee~ in the past four years, extremely
active in all spheres and this activity seems to have reaped
much success.

Recent events

(the May attacks on police

stations and railway lines in Durban and Johannesburg) indicate
that ~ctivity continues and that more and more individuals are
open to the ANC and its particular view of the struggle.

The

words of a white South African priest exiled in Zimbabwe, who
recently announced he would join the ANC, demonstrate the
breadth of appeal presently enjoyed by the ANC:
"Christians in Zimbabwe, sharing with South African
Christians can conving )them to join the revolution in
3
a whole-hearted way."
.
Almost all commentators agree that the post-Soweto
period has seen a stark rise in the sheer amount of resistance
inside South Africa.

A recent and major United Nations General

Assembly study on developments in S-0uth Africa says that
''all evidence fr-0m different sources points consistently
to major advances since 1976 in the forces of liberation

51) Focus, Nos. 17, 19, July/November 1978.
52) The Citizen, April 15, 1981.
53) Ibid.
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in the broadest sense, in terms of organization and
unity, in terms of a growth in military capacity and
in terms of political consciousness." 54)
Some commentators have st a ted their assessment of
the resistance struggle inside South Africa in even stronger
terms.

The prestigious Rockefeller Study Commission on US

Policy Toward Southern Africa concluded in May of this year:
"As South Africa enters the 1980s, perhaps the most
dramatic trend in black politics is the resurgence of the
African National Congress." 55)

PAC
The creation of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
in 1959, answered the need for an 'Africanis;'

theory of

national liberation that the ANC had been, up until then,
unable to satisfy.

Africans were, and remain today, at the

bottom of the social scale in South African society.

Coloureds

and Indians, though suffering from racial oppression under the
apartheid regime, do not share the same objective conditions
as Africans.

Consequently,

it is vital, according to the PAC,

for all Africans to unite into one political force that alone
will decide the path the liberation struggle will take.
Further, it will decide upon the terms on which other ethnic
groups may remain in South Africa.

The racial minorities

will only be permitted to remain if they accept the political,
economic and social structures developed by Africans.

There

will be no minority rights.
While the ANC accepts the thesis that Africans are
economically and politically at the bottom of South African
society, it differs greatly in its interpretation of this and
its consequences for the struggle.

Joe Slovo, a member of the

SACP and ANC claims that the PAC strategy is
"objectively liable to alienate vital potential allies
in the struggle, to make it easier for the enemy to
54) General Assembly, United Nations, Developments in South
Africa Since the Uprisings of 1976, A/Conf. 107/3,
20 April, 1981, p.18.
55) Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, South
Africa: Time Running Out, University of California Press,
1981, p.202.
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win them over as opponents of the liberation thrust.
It ignores the very kernal of the art of political
leadership which demands in the first place thi
widest possible yoking of actual and potential allies,
and the exploitation of division and weakness within
the enemy camp; without of course, compromising the
main direction of the struggle.
An emphasis on the
liberation of the African people does not therefore
imply a line-up of the Africanist against the rest."56)
The PAC though, remains in fundamental disagreement
with the ANC's arguments, largely, for the reasons outlined
in the sections which follow.
"The tragedy of the South African political situation
is that many allegedly progressive white intellectuals
fail to outgrow the racist environment into which they
are born and bred.
As a result, they seek to infiltrate the liberation movement in order to shape its
policy and programme in the image of their own intellectual wavering.
They seek to import into the movement the racist antagonism of the white man against
the Africans.
This antagonism becomes particularly
acute when the Africans refuse to serve the private
political interests of the 'progressive' white man.57)
Non-Africans, all enjoying some privileges in apartheid
society cannot objectively join the struggle in the same way
as Africans.

Whites and Indians all have a stake in apartheid

and consequently ideal conditions for them to join the struggle
are non-existent.

Africans, on the other hand, have no stake

in apartheid, since their only long-term interest remains its
destruction.

Only Africans can lead the liberation struggle

effectively.

In light of these arguments, the objectives of

the PAC as outlined in its Policy and Programme are as follows:
"To create an organizational machinery for the organization and mobilization of the African people into a
powerful social force bent ~pon the destruction of all
forces and factors that have reduced their stature of
man and retarded his growth in our country, and to
create conditions favorable for the restoration of
man's human worth and dignity and for the full development of his social personality;

56) Joe Slovo, No Middle Road, pp. 131-132.
57) PAC in Perspective, op.cit., p.16.
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"To establish for the liberation movement a training
ground for the production of a determined, dedicated
and disciplined collective leadership which will serve
as a symbol of, and living example for, national unity
and act as a repository, guardian and custodian of the
ideas, principles, methods, policies and programmes of
the movement."58)
However, organizationally, the PAC in the last few

years has fallen into disarray,
on all aspects of its work.

and this has had consequences

The PAC has had continuous trouble

with its leadership, and has been unable at times to integrate
new members into its organizational structure.

The expulsion

of seven central committee members at the Arusha, Tanzania
conference in 1978 was undertaken according to the PAC since
these members were accused of "circulating documents which
endanger clandestine party members, and of organizing within
the PAC opposition to the leadership. 1159 )
The official PAC
explanation concerning the expulsions has nevertheless not
been accepted by all:
"Sources close to the PAC say the expulsions are the
latest phase of internal turmoil that was heightened
last year (1977) by the large-scale influx into the
party of young militant refugees from the African
township of Soweto.
The Soweto youth accuse Leballo
and other PAC members of being out of touch with events
in Southern Africa and of being more interested in
holding on to their posieions than in engaging in the
liberation struggle."60)
The youth's call was for a change in leadership and it is
claimed that the expulsions occurred not for reasons of indiscipline, but for having backed the young militants'

call.

Another problem still left unresolved during the 1978 conference
was that of who was to be named president.

Leballo, the acting

chairman of the PAC was unable to acquire enough votes to fill
the post.

Unable to decide unanimously on the person who

should assume these responsibilities, the post remained vacant.
58) Ibid., page 12.
59) Africa News, July 10, 1978.
60) Ibid.
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In an interview given to Africa News a few weeks after
the end of the conference, the PAC Director for Education and
Manpower refuted the arguments that there were internal
·
.
.
.
.
. , , 61 )
dissensions
within
t h e organization.
The Arus h a con f erence
was able, according to him, to strengthen PAC structures within
South Africa and that those expelled during the conference were
only a small minority.
Nevertheless, despite his claims, divisions within
the PAC grew more alarming during the months that followed.
David Sibeko, a prominent leader in the PAC, who played an
important role in building PAC support inside South Africa,
was assassinated in 1979.

In Tanzania, six people were charged

with the June 11 murder, and another twelve were detained for
62 )
.
.
.
t h e purpose o f t h e investigation.
Lea d ers o f t h e P AC 1 ater
claimed that Sibeko was killed by three agents of the South
63
African regime masquerading as freedom fighters,
) but again,
arguments to the contrary dispute these claims.

The murder

was seen by others to be aimed at eliminating the Presidential
Council to which Sibeko was nominated, and reinstall Leballo
to the head of the PAC.

The Presidential Council, seen as a

threat to Leballo's authority~ was to be eliminated.

Whether

these allegations are correct or not, Leballo's controversial
role within the PAC was nevertheless existent since he was
expelled as chairman in late 1979, and· replaced by Visumzi
64)
Mk
a e.
In light of this, the problems facing the PAC
could not be, as Potlako Leballo stated in Azania News

(July/

August 1978), simply a question of internal contradictions
caused by the struggle.
"At the beginning of this year, we said that we saw the
tasks of the struggle in 1978 as the regrouping of the
forces of our people in order to assemble, train and
deploy our scattered forces and fragmented movement.
The internal contradictions of the struggle are the
major cause of our problems, and this can be found in
all revolutions."65)
61)
62)
63)
64)
65)

Africa News, July 31, 1978.
Africa News, July 6, 1979.
Daily News, February 27, 1981.
Southern Africa, November/December 1979.
Azania News, July/August 1978.
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- 25 The continuing crisis within the PAC had an effect on
the Organization of African Unity Conference in 1979.

Whereas

the year before, the question of AN~/PAC unity had been raised,
.
.
.
d 66 )
Th e Ch.
in
1979 the question
was not even mentione.
airman
of the PAC presidential council, Vusi Make, stated that two
factions were at war,

and that gangsterism and gross indiscipline
Additionally, some commentators

were rife within the movement.

pointed out that Sibeko's funeral in Botswana failed to attract
large crowds.

This, they interpreted as a clear sign of loss

of support for the PAC.

New African magazine claimed in

September that these facts were:
"likely to strengthen the group in the OAU that thinks
the ANC only should be recognized - among countries
favouring exclusive ANC recognition are Angola,
Mozambique, Zambia, Algeria, Benin, Ethiopia, GuineaBissau and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Furthermore, countries like Swaziland and Lesotho now
appear to support this position after they detained
PAC exiles - allegedly because they were interfering
in the internal affairs of their host countries."67)
Continuously,

there is intense internal discussion

within the Tanzanian Government about de-recognition of the
PAC.

A memorandum dated 26.9.1979 circulated within the

Tanzanian Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that Tanzania should
de-recognize the PAC but that if it did so "it (Tanzania) would
be in a very awkward position because ·so many other African
States have stopped recognizing the PAC and therefore the
Tanzanian Government would have no place to send all the PAC
people."

Tanzanian security officials believe that P.K. Leballo,

the recently ousted PAC chairman, is an agent of the South
African and Amin Governments.

There is a continuing concern

that the PAC is greatly infiltrated.

This concern is so serious

that a 1979 memorandum from the President's office suggested
preventing all PAC members from coming to Tanzania.
66) New African, September 1979.
67) Ibid.
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In this period of turmoil within the PAC, it is
difficult to find any evidence of activity actually undertaken
against the white supremacist regime.

The main, if not only,

major activity undertaken by the P t c since the Soweto uprisings
within South Africa

was led by those accused in the Bethal 18
68
trial of trying to overthrow the South African government.
)

This trial, held for 18 ~onths baginning in January 1978, was
· for activities conducted by the accused in 1976 and 1977.
Additionally, there is the fact that 23 more PAC guerillas
~ere caught in northern South Africa in late ·1978, the Justice

Minister, Kruger said:
"that there were indications that 78 recruits were
being trained in China, but as far as he knew, the
PAC was falling into decline."69)
The Bethal trial further reinforced Kruger's statement as it
was a serious setback for the PAC's South African underground
network.

It has also been reported that China seems to be
70
increasingly reluctant to give the PAC continued support.
}
If this is correct, the PAC is far from having resolved the

problems that have continuously beset it.
"In recent years the PAC, though recognized along with
the ANC by the Organization of African Unity as one
of South Africa's historic liberation movements, has
been beset by internal rivalries.
For this reason,
among others, it has increasi~gly been ~clipsed by the
ANC which is regarded by most observers as having more
coherent ideology and organization and a broader range
of support in South Africa and overseas."71)
Despite the rather poor record of activity and unity
of the PAC since 1978, various changes have occured and seem
to provide grounds for believing that the PAC may be beginning
to overcome its internal prdblems.
At the Central Committee extra-ordinary session in
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, held in February 1981, various measures
68)
69)
· 70)
71)

Focus, March 1978.
Southern Africa, January 1979.
Africa Confidential, January 28, 1981.
Africa News, March 1981.
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were adopted to reestablish the PAC as a viable liberation
movement.

Nyati Pokela, a PAC leader formerly imprisoned on

Robbe~Island,

and said to be capa~le of uniting the PAC

forces, managed to flee South Africa and was quickly promoted
to the role of Chairman of the PAC.

This nomination could make
72
the PAC's problems a thing of the past.
)
Since his nominati"on,
Pokela has stressed the need fo~ unity and has set forth on .a
campaign to explain clearly what the policies of the PAC really
are.

The Central Committee meeting also called for all those

who were expelled in 1978 to rejoin the PAC.
In mid-June this year, the PAC members accused of
killing David Sibeko were found guilty of manslaughter and
were sentenced to 15 years each.

The Tanzanian High Court

judges stated that they did not believe there had ever been
an "internal plot to eliminate the leadership of the PAC".
Nor did they believe that Vusumzi Make, who had hidden in the
closet during the shooting, was in any way involved.

Generally,

in spite of inconsistencies between statements to the police
and testimony in the court, Make's testimony was found credible.
Finally, the High Court determined that "the shooting was an
act of the highest degree of recklessness."
A PAC press release

73

) demonstrates the high hopes

the organization has with the nomination of Pokela as chairman:
"Today the PAC is proud to announce that in a short
period of one month since the arrival of comrade Pokela,
major steps have been taken to unite the PAC abroad.
In concrete terms, we announce the unconditional return
to the fold of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
of seventy-two comrades expelled in Arusha, Tanzania,
in July 1978.
The return · of these comrades heralds a
major step along the path of uniting the PAC, consolidating it internally and strengtheningits organizational and revolutionary potentials.
Their unconditional return, moreover, is concrete proof that
comrade Pokela has achieved significant success, in a
very short period, in fulfilling his mission."74)
72) Africa News, March 1981.
73) March 19, 1981.
74) Azania Co~tact, March 1981.
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- ·2s These claims of the PAC are reflected in press reports
.d
.
worldwi e.
The Rand Daily
Mai·175) covered the conference, and
stated that the bid to regroup began with the expulsion of
Leballo as chairman in 1979, and is'' continuing with the newly
76
appointed· chairman Pokela.
Africa News
) also states that
Pokela had been close to Sobukwe, the PAC's first leader and
major ideological source who died in 1978.

This, Africa News

, argued, would perhaps help bring about the changes needed.
Despite these modifications, various problems still
continue to tarnish the PAC's image.

Questions raised in the

trial for the murder of Sibeko continue.

It is also far from

clear how deep dissent has permeated the structure of the
organization.

Additionally, changes under the Pokela leader-

ship are far too fresh to be able to determine whether they

will be of significance and manage to build support internally
and internationally.

All in all, it remains problematic

whether the new developments will enable the PAC to become a
liberation movement capable of fighting the apartheid regime
of South Africa.

* * * * * * * * *

75) March 27, 19el
76) March 30, 1981.

